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ABSTRACT
There have been increasing levels of sophistication in the continuous battles between cyber
criminals and law enforcement/cybersecurity practitioners. For example, Dark net operators often
take advantage of the evasion techniques to hide their criminal activities, such as hosting illegal
content, selling illegal materials, or terror-information exchanges. Web cloaking and fast-fluxing
are the two common ones. Fast-fluxing constantly changes the host IP addresses and offers higher
degree availability & robustness for malicious domain users. Web cloaking allows some dynamic web
contents be sent at ordinary times, but different contents may be triggered by specific keywords on
search engines or other geo-locations. Both contribute to the great challenges to cybersecurity and
law enforcement practitioners, due to the fact that at the time of evidence collection, evidential data
from the source may be simply not the same as that the evidence generated earlier for malicious
purposes. Index Terms: Malicious Domains, Cloaking Technique, Fast-Fluxing, Search Engine,
Network Security
1CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
In this paper, we will present new active probing-based schemes for detecting cloaking fast-flux
malicious domains. In our prototype platform, we have integrated our schemes with the Tor system
so that our query and evidence collection are anonymous and distributed, to avoid the detection of
malicious domain-hosting servers. During the last 10 months, we have used this system to collect
evidence data using six of the top ten worldwide search engines (e.g., Bing, Baidu, Ask, AOL,
Lycos and Search). Using the collected data, we developed algorithmic data analytic solutions to
extract and classify the malicious fast-fluxing and web-cloaking domains. Such effective evidence
collection and analytic solutions will help law enforcement practitioners in their casework handling
such malicious domains.
1.1 Motivation
The origins of the Internet date back to the 1960s when people first began to build robust,
fault-tolerant communications via computer networks. In the early 1990s, we saw the beginning of
the transition to the modern Internet and the initiation of Web-based services, motivating more
and more enterprise networks and personal computers to be connected to the Internet. By the late
2000s, Internet-based services and technologies had been incorporated into virtually every aspect
of modern life, as an associated effect, many suspicious domains appeared on the Internet. For
example, it has been reported that many active online Darknets (using Tor hidden services) as
well as other illegal online underground markets have been discovered to be relevant to cybercrime.
Phishing is another serious internet problem.
Throughout the whole world, search engines perform about 120,000 searches per second, and
in 2016 1,220,523 phishing websites were detected, a fully 65 percent increase over 2015, and the
number of phishing attacks has been greatly increasing since the latter part of the 20th century.
2Such attacks may be disguised as as spoofed email, fake websites, or even part of a user’s web
browser, and victims are usually tricked by attackers into unconsciously providing their personal
information, allowing attackers to capture user names, passwords, banking accounts, credit card
numbers, etc. Attackers steal billions of dollars per year using phishing attacks, and network
security research studies focused on such attacks have developed a variety of detection systems, the
most popular type of anti-phishing tool being a web browser plugin.
These technologies, however, exhibit some serious drawbacks, and contemporary attackers make
detecting phishing attack much harder by using web-cloaking techniques to perpetrate their online
crimes. According to my study, while most contemporary cyber-criminal detection techniques are
based on a black-list system, analyzing DNS traffic, domain information, etc., phishing attacks
more closely resemble social engineering, and cloaking techniques use IP identification, user-agent,
referer, JavaScripts and Geo-location methods.
For cloaking anti-detection techniques, an intruder might monitor data downloading with typ-
ical limits of only 15 MB, massive external scripts, and unauthorized redirects, but all proposed
detection techniques seem to present some serious disadvantages. Additionally, nowadays attackers
have developed and are using more advanced techniques, like web-cloaking to conduct their online
criminal activities, makes detection of phishing or other malicious attacks even more difficult.
With respect to cloaking attacks, also known as ’bait and switch’, the very first study we’ve
seen was that of Wu and Davidson[1]. A cloaking web can hide the origin or intentional content and
nature of a website by delivering a different intended webpage contents to some selected specific
user group based, for example, on location or age preference. Nowadays, while users are often
accustomed to heavily relying on information asked of search engines like Google, Baidu, and
Bing, we have seen more and more untrustful information and contents returned from such online
sources. For example, many people use the Google search engine as a simple mechanism for finding
a particular website and click it, and users still generally trust results from major search engines
and are willing to believe that relevant and useful responses (results) about websites listed in the
top-ranking positions are returned from the search engine, even though this may not be true.
3This paper aims at detection and investigation of the kinds of domains that host malicious
websites/contents appearing in the top-ranking list positions of search engine results. In this
paper, we first identify and characterize the occurrence of suspicious interaction between malicious
domains (for example phishing or cloaking-based illegal online drug seller domain) and search engine
results, and then discuss possible effective countermeasures against them.
1.2 Contribution
In this study, we first explore issues that deserve attention with respect to detecting and investi-
gating malicious domain effects present in search engine results, considering the phishing attack and
its variations as an example. In general, phishing websites/contents are not specifically designed
for specific victims, and they vary considerably in terms of their strategies, hiding techniques, and
other environmental factors. For example, IP fast-fluxing and web cloaking are the two most com-
mon phishing schemes, and countermeasures against them can be ineffective and suffer from serious
drawbacks such as inability to properly handle IP fast-fluxing or to detect cloaking-based phishing
websites because they can only detect phishing websites with some specific and fixed features.
We have developed a distributed and active-probing-based scheme that uses Fast-Flux and
Web-Cloaking techniques for collecting evidence about malicious domains. The platform uses Tor
as a supporting infrastructure for query of search engine servers from different geographical regions
located all over the world. The wide range of selected phishing websites and associated search
engine results described our study also ensures that our results are general, universal, and reli-
able, and they also avoid location specific preferences. We have designed effective data analytic
approaches to investigate malicious Fast-Flux Web-Cloaking based domains. Our approach com-
bines the advantages and strengths of previously known phishing detection systems by extracting
features, contents, server meta data, and IP addresses. We carefully collect search terms, and,
based on our own preliminary analysis, repeatedly and anonymously crawl the pages from different
locations and at different times.
4Our experimental results demonstrate that these approaches produce superior accuracy and are
indispensable in effectively dealing with malicious domains. We have conducted statistical analysis
on the results returned from several search engines and keyword categories. We provide a conjecture
explaining the phenomenon discovered during the study, and develop an effective solution to the
phishing problem.
1.3 Organization of the Manuscript
We have organized the rest of this paper in the following way. We describe the background
of malicious domain detection and related work in Section II to provide an overview of malicious
domain investigation and point out some issues in current research. Section III provides an in-
depth study and description of our technical solutions. Section IV describes several experiments
and corresponding analysis regarding the investigative approaches. Finally, we conclude the paper
and suggest future directions in Section V.
5CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
2.1 Introduction
Most known anti-phishing tools are based on ’black-list’ systems, data transactions, content
monitoring, and http headers, but for a long time some phishing attackers have been using web-
cloaking techniques. The author of [2] mentioned they tested 10 security toolbars, and found that
most security toolbars do not work as expected, only identifying 50 percent of phishing websites
in that study. The situation might be even much worse using web cloaking, in phishing sites
provide trustable web page content to evade possible detection from anti-phishing tools, then deliver
phishing content to the victims, and wait for the victims to take the bait iso they can steal private
information from the victims.
In this chapter, we will explain the features of Tor networks, cloaking technique, and phishing
technique. Cloaking technique have been used in many areas for searching results, advertisement
and auto-downloads. Also, attackers have been using phishing techniques to steal private user
information and financial account information for many years. Tor networking is a free worldwide
anonymous communication software that anyone could use to enter a network, also Tor network
could be programmed by Selenium package which is open source, easy to read and edit.
2.2 Cloaking
Cloaking was defined in the late 1990s as a search engine optimization technique. The original
use of cloaking permitted a web page holder to optimize the performance of a search engine crawler.
Each search engine has its own crawler, e.g., Google has ’Googlebot’ , to read and visit webpage
all the time, and attackers noticed that they could achieve very effective penetration using cloaking
techniques, often contemporarily described as spam hiding techniques. With cloaking techniques,
the website content presented to the search engine spider is manipulated by the owner of website,
6so different visitors would view different content in a browser. Perkins [3] indicated that the main
purpose of a cloaking technique is to manipulate the search engine rankings of returned results. In
many senses, cloaking techniques have been treated as search engine spam accomplished simply by
delivering content based on IP addresses or HTTP headers associated with user requests.
2.2.1 Cloaking Types
Wang and Savage [4] distinguished four different cloaking types: Repeat cloaking, User agent
cloaking, Redirection cloaking, and IP Cloaking, and all existing cloaking detections have limita-
tions when using either IP Cloaking or redirection Cloaking detection. Because of the particular
features of a search engine spider, it could not visit a website as a real browser, so search engine
spiders could not execute JavaScript code or PHP code built into the website. Unfortunately,
malicious software components are made from such codes.
Table 2.1 Cloaking Set
Type Defines
Repeat Cloaking Web server delivering different web content based on visit times of visitors.
User-agent Cloaking Web Server delivering specific web content based on visitors’ User-agent String
IP Cloaking Web Server delivering specific web content based on visitors’ IP
Redirection Cloaking Web server redirect users to another website by using JavaScript
Referrer Cloaking Web Server delivering specific web content based on visitors’ referrer String
Using a repeated cloaking technique, a web server could deliver different web contents to a
given visitor; for example, a visitor might view different web content on the same webpage if he
revisited this website. Using a user-agent cloaking technique, a web server would be aware visitor
identification; for example, the Google search engine spider’s User-agent String would be ’ google
’, ’ slurp ’, for Yahoo’s spider, ’ bingbot ’ and ’ msnbot ’,for Microsoft’s spider. Using an IP
cloaking technique, a web server would be able to deliver specific web content based on a visitors’
IP; for example, a visitor could view different web content when visiting the same website with two
different computers. Using a redirection cloaking technique, a web server could redirect users to
another website through massive scripts; for example, a visitor might enter the URL of webpage A,
7but might actually visit webpage B. Using a referrer cloaking technique, a web server might deliver
specific web content based on a visitors’ referrer String; for example, a visitor might view different
web content if he clicks URLs received in response to a Google search or a Bing search.
2.3 Phishing
Phishing is defined a social engineering technique that attempt to obtain sensitive information
such as usernames, passwords, credit card information, bank information, social security numbers,
etc, might by using the disguise of a trustworthy entity in network communications. The Fast
Flux Service Network (FFSN), a technique has been used by online criminals for a long time, is a
network of compromised computer systems with public DNS records that constantly change. The
basic idea of FFSN is to have numerous IP addresses, changing at high frequency, associated with
a single qualified domain name, to keep an online criminal safe.
2.3.1 Phishing Types
Nowadays. This technique could hide malicious activities and extend the malicious servers’
lifetime, significantly increasing damage by an online criminal.Content delivery network (CND) is
a large interconnected system of cache servers that use geographical proximity to delivery the data.
Round Robin Domain Name (RRDN) System is a type of domain name service which distributes
clients to multiple servers in a round robin manner and scales performance without high availability.
Fast flux DNS is a technique that a cybercriminal might use to prevent identification of his key
host server’s IP address. By abusing the way the domain name system works, the criminal can
create a botnet with nodes that join and drop off the network faster than law enforcement officials
can trace them. 20
Fast-flux networks (FFNs) are differentiated from legitimate CDNs by their nodes. The nodes
in a legitimate CDN are professionally administrated machines, while the nodes in a FFN, also
known as flux-agents, are malware-infected machines.
8Flux-agents are often found to be a part of a botnet, and remotely controlled by a botmaster.
Botnets using the fast-flux technique can obtain an extra layer of protection by using flux-agents
as proxies that relay user requests to back-end servers, also known as motherships, because the
frequent and fast changing of flux-agents in the FFN makes it more difficult to track down criminal
activities and shut down their operation.
2.3.1.1 Single flux and Double flux
A single fast-flux system usually contains multiple nodes for both registering and unregistering
the address. This kind of model usually records the DNS address of a single DNS entry and generate
an address list of changing objects related to the single domain; this list could contain hundreds or
even thousands of entries. Generally, the TTL(Time To Live) of single-flux DNS records are very
short, because a cybercriminal would want to make sure that the record and the address will not
be recorded.
Double flux is similar to single flux but much more difficult to deal with. Multiple servers
combine into a mothership that registers and unregisters the generation of DNS lists and NS
records. This type of system has a protection layer, i.e., even if a node of this system has been
detected, the address of the host cannot be found. Because of the huge number of agents, It?s
possible to completely protect the cybercriminal, also increasing the survival rate of the malicious
software.
2.3.2 Existing Phishing detections
Varshney, et al., [5] proposed a Lightweight Phish Detector (LPD) that detects phishing sites
by gathering information from a Google search engine. The domain is extracted from the URL of a
suspicious website, then combines the website URL with the website title as a searching keyword.
To identify a suspicious phishing website, they send their searching keyword as a query to the
Google search API, and analyze the top N results returned to determine whether this website is
legitimate or suspicious.
9Cantina’s [6] technique detects phishing sites based on the textual content of a website resource.
It uses an algorithm called Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TFIDF) to gather highly
important words from the textual content of the website. IDF measures the importance of such a
term across the entire collection. TFIDF sets weights to each word in the collection document and
queries with top weighted words to the search engine to determine whether website is legitimate.
Prakash, et al., [7] proposed a blacklist-based approach. To detect phishing sites, they predict
new phishing URLs based on integrating the features of known valid phishing URLs. To generating
new phishing websites, they combine operations on IP address, top-level domains (TLD), directory
structure, and brand names of existing phishing URLs.
Routhu, et al., [8] proposed a Web Content check system based on common web factors and
features. They crawl page source from suspicious phishing websites? login pages and feed fake
values into login fields. Their algorithm and detection system will monitor and check response
from a website to determine whether or not it is a phishing website.
Saeed Abu-Nimeh, et al., [9], reminding us how important it is to detect the phishing websites,
calculate and simulate dangerous phishing attacks with different machine learning methods, includ-
ing Logistic Regression, Classification and Regression Trees, Bayesian Additive Regression Trees,
Support Vector Machines, Random Forests, and Neural Networks.
10
2.4 Tor network
A Tor network, also known as the Onion Router, allows a user to enter a network with worldwide
anonymous encryption communication. In 1995, the United States Naval Research Laboratory and
DARPA sponsored an anonymous networking communication tool that could hide its own track on
the internet. In later 2004, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) began sponsorship of the Tor
project, but in later 2005 EFF no longer supported the Tor project as a sponsor but continued to
maintain the Tor project website .
Using the Tor browser, a user could set up an onion proxy on the local machine to communicate
with another Tor network user within a certain period to build a network virtual circuit. In the Tor
browser, every user appears like a node in the circuit, and the Tor network also provides dynamic
integration, in which once a user visits an IP address via the Tor browser, it will randomly pick
up a node as an external exit node. Typically, bases on consideration of both loading rate and
security, each stream would have only 2 to 5 nodes.
Consider the situation shown in Figure 2.1, and assume Alice wants to visit Bob through a Tor
network. According to the onion proxy, the Tor browser would randomly pick up 2 to 5 other Tor
users as an external exit node, and all transactions and communications except the communication
between Bob and Last exit node are encrypted,. Bob would only be able to identify the last exit
node but he can’t track the request back to Alice, so Bob cannot reliably identify the person he’s
communicating with.
Using Tor, most applications and programs would be able to use anonymous networks for IRC,
real-time communication, and visiting webpages. Tor also would allow a user to choose the country
of last exit node and the number of nodes. In our research, we used a Tor network to locate our
IP address in 5 different countries to enable testing of IP Cloaking and Geo-location cloaking.
11
Figure 2.1 How Tor Network Steps
12
2.5 Criteria Review
While phishing websites are usually poor in quality and easily recognized by victims if they
directly visit them, it’s hard to identify a malicious website if combines both phishing and cloaking
techniques. Users tend to trust search engines, but search engines are possibly deceived by cloaked
malicious websites. With a Tor network, we are eligible to identify the cloaking technique appeared
on the top relevance search result list and detect the phishing website directly. The Onion Router
uses a P2P network to randomly transport communication through the a circuit, possibly hiding
source address and communication path.
13
CHAPTER 3. TECHNICAL APPROACH
Figure 3.1 Multi-tiered Architectural Framework for Malicious Domain Investigation and
Detection
As the figure of Multi-tiered Architectural Framework for Malicious Domain Investigation and
Detection, it roughly shows the multi-tiered architectural framework of our malicious domain in-
vestigation and detection system.
3.1 Introduction
The Tier I module collects evidential data from the suspicious websites provided by users and
website information we collected from search engines. In Tier II, we send a keyword set through
the Tor network to search engine servers from different geo-locations, e.g., we might visit and
load suspicious websites from US,UK,FR,DE, and AU. After collecting the search engine results,
we visit these websites at different times from different locations. The Tier III module verifies
a suspicious website with all the features and returned data of a suspicious website collected by
multiple approaches. The following subsections describes in detail the steps and approaches taken
to solve this problem.
14
3.2 Pre-setting
In this research, we are running an active probing-based schemes and data analytics for investi-
gating malicious Fast-Flux Web-Cloaking based domains. According to the massive data collection
process, we have to start multi-task at same time, thus we could start multi-process at same or
we could do it on different servers. It’d be best if we could support multiple servers, and in our
research we have one AWS server and one local machine to collect data. Furthermore, the network
speed should be able to support viewing multiple massive webpage at same time, otherwise, the
program would return 404 error code or Document Object Model control exceptions. Selenium
package is an automating web applications for testing purposes and even web-based administration
tasks would be automated. In the latest version of Selenium package, they have already combined
WebDriver and previous version of Selenium packages, which is powerful and easy to install and
use.
3.3 Data Collection
Figure 3.2 shows the procedure of data collection, with data resources composed of Zone files,
Suspicious URL asked, and Keyword sets. The Zone file 21 contains all the Versign domain
names published this year, and our detection system also allows users to check any suspicious URL
by a simply request to our API. We select 440 different terms from several of the most common
categories, and all such terms will be sent as requests to different search engines multiple times
from multiple GEO-locations, followed by collecting all website search engine responses.
3.3.1 Collecting URLs
Collection of searching terms is the cornerstone of our research method. To build meaningful
and convinced term sets for our research, we targeted different categories’ of keywords. The author
of the first study on Cloaking technique, mentioned in Section II, found 29.5% results for searches
of cheap luxury products contained redirected URLs , highly possible cloaking phishing websites.
The strategy for choosing keywords for searching is to detect the most common and necessary
15
Figure 3.2 Procedure of Data Collection
keyword while trying to minimize processing time on the benign fetched content. We first collected
230 terms from both the medicine industry and the the financial area because we believed attackers
could be more interested at these two categories since they fit the rhythm of the current times and
people pay more attention to them than to any others. In the middle segment of our research, we
collected 20 published dangerous search keyword terms [10] [11] to remind us that attackers might
not have been limited to only these two special categories. We therefore extended our keyword term
set to three more categories: engineering industry keywords from different industries, educational
keywords, and popular names. We realized that these three categories could not yet cover all
dangerous search terms, because a common aspect of dangerous words is that they represent the
hottest topic at particular instants of time, so during the the later interval of our project, we added
top popular search terms to our term set. We crawled the top 10 popular search terms from Google
hot searches every week in hope that inclusion of such terms would help us fix leaks of our keyword
16
search terms and detect short-term cloaking pages poorly detected by current methods. In addition
to such hot terms, other terms in our term set were included to help us to detect other cloaking
web pages.









Figure 3.3 Google’s Approach
Figure 3.3 is the tableTable VII: List of browser, network, and contextual configurations from
23 . While this suggests a different group of environment variables, there is still a limitation
with respect to the Geo-location cloaking technique, also the most common drawback in current
detection methods. In our detection method, we use a Tor network to relocate while we’re visiting
website, and are therefore able to defeat the Geo-Location cloaking technique.
We queried our search term sets to 5 of the world-wide top 10 search engines. We crawled the
first 10 ranking sites from every search engine because they were the most dangerous sites for users
17
Algorithm 1 Loading URLs
1: for keywordinkeysets do
2: Query keyword to search engines with Tor network
3: Read response web page from search engines
4: for Itemsinresponsepage do
5: Record URL,Tittle,Abstract
6: Collect DNS & GeoIP
7: Open URL with Tor browser
8: Wait for page loading
9: Record HTML content
10: Wait 1 day or 3 days
11: Re-query keyword to search engines with Tor network
12: end for
13: end for
who trust search engines. We visited each link listed on the top 10 ranking and collect all visible
and invisible data from that website. To most convincingly act as a real visitor instead of search
engine spider visiting the suspicious website, we used the selenium package to pretend to be a real
visitor. By using selenium, we were able to open browser and visit any website, meaning that every
query and request used in our research will be identified as an actual user on the web server side.
Table 3.2 Database Table
Category Defination
ID unique ID, which is the primary Key
Tittle Tittle of selected link appeared on search engine
site URL of selected link appeared on search engine
abstract abstract of selected link appeared on search engine
keyword appeared with which keyword searched, foreign key
html original html content of loading page
html body html content of loading page without scripts and html codes
date The date of this item insert into database
ac the country we load this page from,(UK,US,DE,FR,AU,CN)




For decreasing latency in the data collection process, we decided to only load scripts the first
time we visited a given website. Using PhantomJS allowed loading everything published by a
website, even if they were trying to hide running scripts. This PhantomJS version data as stored
in our database as a landmark of such a website. We then unloaded client-side scripts and crawled
all the other content the web holder published on the website using the Tor network from different
visiting locations. We query each new added term to all the search engines three times, with the
first the full version of this website loaded by PhantomJS, and the second and third versions concise
versions loaded by the Tor browser. Every two weeks we will reload this website with PhantomJS
and start a test check aimed at this website. We all know there are uncountable websites and staff
updates every day, and all search engines are time-sensitive. A single search engine can return
different websites even when searched with the same keyword term with only a one-day gap. At a
Search engines’ search page, we collect all related data from a website, including its URL,Title, and
Abstract. After opening a browser and visiting a given URL, we collect all the published content
from the selected website and its DNS server information. To be more precise, we store several
different versions of content, the first version the original HTML version we obtained by direct
crawling of selected website, the remaining being purely text content versions after getting rid of
all HTML tags and scripts from the HTML version. For more accuracy and to staying closer to
civilian behavior, we limit our network speed at 25 MB/s, so we could not load a website if it had
too much massive scripting.
Algorithm 2 Classifier
for CollectedWebsites do
2: Check Relational Factor between keyword and Tittle
Check Relational Factor between keyword and Abstract
4: Check Relational Factor between keyword and HTML
for RepeatedWebsites do




It is well-known that a cloaking phishing website would be likely to have massive executable
scripts on both the server side and the client side. According to information the web holder provided
to search engines, we begin a check on the relational factors between a search term and this website.
First we simplify search terms based on the most common and popular 26 suffixes [12]. After we
simplify the search term to obtain the shortest possible search term, we are able to calculate the
longest possible term. If the search term contains multiple words, based on our calculation and
collected data, we assume that the longest reasonable distance between multiple related words
appearing in one paragraph is 15 words. As a result of a keyword-related test, we determine four
different influencing factors to identify possible cloaking phishing websites: Title, Abstract, HTML-
related factor between keyword term, and Domain repeated factor. Since our research was based
on use of 5 different search engines and multiple search using the same search-term set, it’s possible
that the same URL show up on different search engines. Appearance of a URL on different engines
will make this URL trustful and convinced. In this case, we set an influence factor for each entry;
if Title or abstract-related tests fail, we add 1 suspicious point to this URL separately; if HTML
content fails a test, we add 3 pts, and if domains are repeated we subtract one point from the
current total for this URL.




Domain Repeated -1 0
Content 0 3
3.3.4 Identify Trustful Website
According to our records and performance of search engines, it is only negligibly possibility
that one phishing domain tricked multiple search engines at the same time, so we query the same
keyword to different engines with a 3-day gap to minimize the possible error in our approach.
Because there is still a possibility that a cloaking phishing website has successfully tricked multiple
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search engines, we prepared an anti-detection method for handling this situation. To identify
both the really trustful websites and the suspicious websites, we have a Performance Handler.
Enhancing system performance is always important, so we use an approximate string matching
system to speed up our suspicious sites filter; based on the length of string we are going to compare
with, we have a different policy for calculating a matching factor. We use the Boyer-Moore [13]
string search algorithm if the keyword’s length is less than 5, the Jaro-Winkler distance if the length
is greater than 5 and less than 10, and Levenshtein distance [14] if the length is greater than 10.
As earlier mentioned, we need to handle websites that repeated multiple times. The features of
cloaking phishing websites and Search Engines require using all the websites, but this seems like a
low efficiency move and it will decrease our performance if this website was safe. To handle this




Cross check with different engines
3: if WebsitesRepeated then
Check Relational Factors
Count Appeared Times C1
6: if C1 > 15 then




We will perform a trustful-factor check on all websites to improve the performance of our
collecting process. For each website, we will first use a filter check(Algorithm 2); if this website failed
the filter check, we will no longer consider it trustful, i.e., it is a suspicious website. If one website
is recorded multiple times in our database, we must still determine if it was a potential cloaking
website, so we will check whether it appeared multiple times on different search engines. Once this
domain name appears on multiple search engines with multiple keywords and has appeared more
than 15 times, we perform a further check on this websites. First of all, we will pass this website
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to our detection system to check whether it is safe, and after this website has passed our detection
system, we will subtract 1 pt from the total suspicious score of this domain name. Once a website
has failed our detection test, we will mark the domain as suspect and will never consider it again as
a trustful domain. The reason this situation is considered so serious is that some attackers might
use some known famous public domain and add their own scripts, e.g., weebly.com/phishing-scripts.
At the very beginning of our study, we added some famous domain names , including www.youtube.com,
www.tieba.baidu.com, twitter.com, www.cbnews.com, www.wikipidia.org, as trustworthy names to
improve the performance of our detection system. On the other hand, if one domain name appears
on multiple search engines with different keyword searched, but appears fewer than 5 times and
failed our filter test, we consider it to be a suspicious cloaking phishing website. During our collec-
tion process, there were some websites that could not load webpages, possibly caused by location
limitation and scripts limitation. We classified each unloaded website as a suspicious website, be-
cause we believe our network environment is able to support most legitimate websites and, although
we could not load the limited websites, we were able to gather published information regarding such
a website from search engines, and the information we gathered is an important part of a further
detection check.
3.4 Detect Cloaking Phishing Websites
Our detection system analyzes all the suspicious cloaking websites that failed our previous
filter test. To handle location limitations of loading problem and IP address cloaking websites,
we first use GeoIP to locate the country of origin of a suspicious website.GeoIP would locate a
computer terminal’s geographic location by identifying the terminal’s IP address. Once we know
the country of this website, we are able to use the Tor Network to relocate our current address to
the selected country, minimizing the risk of possible visit refusal caused by location limitation. To
detect location-limited websites, we will reload this website 3 times in the next 9 days and send this
website to our search engine detection system. After we use GEOIP to filter legitimate and safe
websites from our suspicious list, we use the Tor network to reload suspicious websites from three
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different locations using the following options: United States, France, German, United Kingdom
and Australia. To detect cloaking phishing websites, we simplify the HTML content to text-only
content, removing all tags, scripts, and documents. Even legitimate websites have the possibility
of having different webpages displayed to visitors from different location, but the difference display
content is caused by scripts, so we remove all the scripts and flash documents, keeping the ordinary
text content, and there is no reason an ordinary website would have different text content. Once




visit URL from different locations
Google safe Browsing(Condition 1)
4: Different web content (Condition 2)
Search URL on different search engines
for Response do
Empty response (Condition 3)




Conditions 1 and 4: This website is a verified phishing website.
Conditions 2 and 3: We use GEOIP and DNS information gathered. The DNS information
[16,17,18,19,20] recorded for each website are server location, name server, IPV4 address, and IPV6
address. Once the IP address of a domain is gathered, we map the IP addresses into the ASN,
network address, organization name, and country code. If we are unable to resolve a domain name
using DNS, a NXDOMAIN response will be returned, meaning that this domain did not exist on
the internet. Because malicious domains have much shorter active time than legitimate domains,
by comparison between previous domain information gathered and DNS response, we are able to
evaluate this domain.
Condition 5: We collect the return page and find the URL we searched; if it appears on all the
search engines, then we assume it’s a legitimate website, while if it did not appear on the list, there
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was a similar URL that appeared. We would then compare the abstract and title of both URLs,
and if both URLs have published similar information and similar URLs, we assume the suspicious
URL is a phishing website.
In our recorded data, most cloaking phishing websites appear for only a short time, usually no
more than three days, on the suggestion list provided by search engines, so If we get an empty
result from a search engine while performing a searching test, we could say that this website has
high likelihood of being a phishing website. Because the searching test only tests those websites
on the suggestion list of the search engines, there would be no reason that we get a URL from
Search Engine A while getting an empty result when asking Search Engine A about this URL. If
one website failed our search test, we add its content to our database and record common words
to determine the most popular word in a phishing website. Furthermore, if one website failed with
our search test and returned a regular list with similar URL of legitimate website while searching
this website, we would add both the phishing URL and the legitimate URL to our database and
calculate the most dangerous legitimate URL. For each round of detecting phishing websites, the
program will update the data related to phishing websites, so if one website contains a common
phishing word or the URL of a website is similar to one famous legitimate URL, we will directly
add it to our suspicious website database and immediately begin a searching test.
Based on the existing detection techniques, we decide 6 different factors as our phishing detection
features, which are distinct IP addresses of both host and name server, distinct ASNs of IP addresses
of host and name server, distinct countries of IP addresses of host and name server. We query all
the suspicious websites and zone files, to collect these factors and store them into our database.
For the suspicious websites, we’ve already recorded their information while we search and load the
URL, thus, we only need to compare the query record and the database.
Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 are phishing websites(sztdpower.com/product/show-7365902.html)
detected by our detection system. This website was listed on the top 10 related links from the ’Bing’
search engine with Chinese keyword ’laiyangjiagong’searched. As we can see from figure 3.5, it has
a internal webpage called hbc688.com, the real web content shown to visitors, but a search engines’
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Figure 3.4 Phishing example 1
crawler might only record the data from sztdpower.com, a legitimate and safe website. Without
our detection, people would identify sztdpower.com as a legitimate website and no one would know
there is a phishing website underneath. Since all content from sztdpower.com is safe and clear, this
website would not even be considered as a phishing website by most detections. In the end, we
searched selected suspicious website using multiple search engines and checked the returned results
to determine whether this website had related information provided by different search engines.
Because all the websites and domains we collected are collecting from search engines’ results, if we
searched this specific website on multiple search engines and obtained nonsense results, we could
confirm that this website is a phishing website.
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Figure 3.5 Phishing example 2
26
CHAPTER 4. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
4.1 Introduction
At the beginning of our approach, we loaded suspicious websites from different countries, and
recorded their HTML content into a database to check whether they had similar content even when
loaded from different countries. We also recorded the DNS server information every time we loaded
this website and compare them with our record; once DNS server information is different from that
recorded, and the website fails our check algorithm, we could say that it is a phishing website.
There are two ways that users might be tricked by cloaking phishing websites. First, they might
be tricked by spam email and advertisements; second, they might visit those cloaking websites that
tricked the SEO of search engines successfully listed at the top 10 related ranking websites provided
by search engines. In Figures 2 and 5 reflect searched terms ’laiyangjiagong’ on Bing search engine.
4.1.1 Hypothesis
To detect the cloaking phishing websites that tricked SEO, we collected 413 different keywords
in our search keyword set from different categories, and recorded 50,000 query results, there are
206(0.412%) cloaking phishing websites that listed on the top 10 keyword related list provided by
search engines. Furthermore, We gather 100 phishing websites which have been confirmed as valid
active phishing website from www.phishingtank.com [22] to test our detection system, the result
has proved that our detection system has 98% accuracy rate, because one of our detection protocol
will search our suspicious website on multiple search engines, which means as long as one famous
phishing detection website detected one phishing domain, it has a rare possibility that pass our
detection system.
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 displayed the data collected by querying keyword terms to search




such as the ’Search’ search engine, result in most of the popular keyword terms getting a related
website of cbsnews.com, but after the system added cbsnews.com to our trustful website database,
the number of results from the ’Search’ search engine showed a huge decline. As the figures show,
9.164% of websites failed with our first check, and 4.495% of these suspicious websites failed with
our detection system, meaning that if you click 1000 times on the top 10 related search results from
search engines, then there is a likelihood of 0.412% that you were visiting a phishing website.
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CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented design of an anti-cloaking phishing website approach with high
accuracy rate and wide range. Based on our Classifier section, its´ obvious that our performance
kept enhancing over time, with higher and higher efficiency as more websites were detected.
According to our results, search engines still have a possibility tricked by phishing attackers
with their search engine optimization, as shown in Figure of phishing example. We noticed that
a some phishing URLs are similar to some known famous websites, e.g., www.paybills-pal-sumary-
udate.com with www.paypal.com, www.linkedin.com with www.linkedln.com and www.zijiamining.com
with www.zijinmining.com. We also found that a some phishing websites contain words like o´nline
gambling´, u´nder 18´,´sexy girla´nd f´ree download´. Its´ possible that we could use these two factors
along with our recorded data to identify phishing websites without multiple loading of web pages.
In the future, we plan on developing and optimizing a better, much more user-friendly, user in-
terface so a user could check for suspicious websites using our user interface. We also expect to
add more features of phishing websites to our detection system to enhance the performance of our
detection system, including graphical improvement.
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